The Braer

 

Environmental Health Problems associated with the spill

The Braer incident was unique in the fact that it posed problems for the environmental health and public health professions not normally associated with an oil spill. Consequently problems which were not anticipated in oil spill response plans or routinely dealt with in exercises were very much in evidence from day one.

These problems stemmed from the fact that the combination of light crude oil and extreme weather conditions caused significant pollution of the air, land, and fresh water via an oil/sea water aerosol/droplet mix. Initially the pollution gave rise to a strong smell of oil and reports of irritation to eyes, noses and fears of an imminent explosion risk. Measurements taken on the first evening using a meter designed for checking explosive levels of hydrocarbons at petrol stations, however, ruled out any risks from explosion.

The spill also put severe pressure on the staff and resources within the Shetland Islands Council as a whole but particular within the Environmental Services Department. This stress was not limited to those actively involved in the incident as the others still had to contend with the day to day problems. This situation was exacerbated as the Director and Divisional Manager of Environmental Health had key roles in the joint response being the Vice Chairman of the Management Team and the Chairman of the Environment Team respectively.

The width of environmental health profession and the need for continuous contact through professional organisations, the Scottish Office and the oil industry, proved its worth as contacts for advice and assistance were easily identified. Experts in public health were provided by the Scottish Office, assistance was also given by the Royal Environmental Health Institute of Scotland, who provided a pool of volunteers from which Officers and equipment were drawn from Edinburgh District Council and Orkney Islands Council. The oil industry provided an oil vapour analyser (OVA) and staff to operate it initially and trained local staff. In addition the Shetland Islands Council contacted a consultant in occupational health. This newly formed team of SIC staff and outside help was then equipped to deal with the problems as they arose.

The first decision taken in public health terms following advice from the various contacts and the team that was set up was not to evacuate the immediate area, an option which was being considered for public health and safety reasons. In hindsight this was the correct decision as no long term health implications have been found nor were there any casualties. It must be said that if an evacuation of the locals, almost 600 in number, had taken place there was a very real chance of a fatality through for example an old person having a heart attack, or given the weather conditions, a road traffic accident.

Fears of the Local Population

The aforementioned strong smell of hydrocarbon and the irritation caused to some people's eyes and nose lead to a very real and genuine concern about the effects the oil in the air would have on people's health. This concern was heightened when the MPCU authorised aerial dispersant spraying operations to try and assist the dispersal of oil near the wreck. Unfortunately spraying this oil lead to the accidental over- spraying of people and houses upwind of the target area. Complaints were received and a revised spraying strategy was agreed. The operational height of the aircraft was reduced from 30 feet to 15 feet, above the waves. There would be no spraying near populated areas and the equipment would be switched off at the end of the run and emptied before the aircraft made the approach for the next run. The revised operation was witnessed and approved by the local Councillor, MP and Director of Public Health. In parallel to this it was agreed that no spraying of dispersants would occur above the 60° North line in an attempt to protect salmon cages.

Public concern about spraying was increased by the refusal of MPCU to release the chemical composition of the dispersants due to commercial confidentiality (a policy which has now been reviewed) allowing a view to be expressed that this was because of the very toxic chemicals involved. From the point of view of the JRC Management Team, environment team and for the SIC it was very frustrating that detailed information on the chemical composition of dispersants was not readily available from day 1 and in fact it was day 4 before information was to hand. These two factors could have been avoided and would in my opinion allowed us to keep the public better informed and thereby reduce the stress on the local population. In addition it was reported that members of Greenpeace were handing out leaflets letting locals know that one of the dispersants "dispolene" was banned by the Norwegians.

Communications with the Public

Issues regarding the press are described later in this paper but at this point it is worth noting that during the twice daily press conference all the relevant information was given and we wrongly assumed this was enough for local needs. The fact that we relied on the press only caused the public to feel that they were not receiving first hand or enough detailed local information. When it was realised this was the case methods of communication were put in place including letter "drops", notice boards at shops, post offices, etc. and meetings with community representatives, e.g. Ministers, shop keepers, school teachers, etc. This certainly helped the situation. The 1:2 ratio of press to local people caused another problem as the locals were constantly barraged by press asking questions such as "are you worried about the cancer risk from the benzene in the oil". This also heightened the anxiety and stress levels in the community.

Atmospheric Pollution

There was an obvious need to carry out monitoring of the atmosphere and from day two an OVA was used to take readings in the affected area. By day six, the team set up to monitor the atmosphere had begun a sampling programme using pump samples with absorbents, deposition tiles, diffusive monitors and precipitation samples, as well as a direct reading organic vapour analyser (OVA) with a limit of detection of 1 part per million (ppm). Total organic vapours at places of habitation reached measurable levels only on 12 January.

The sampling locations used for the monitoring of airborne contaminants were either at houses, or other frequented places such as shops, schools, etc. The sampling was concentrated on the areas closest to the site of the wreck and other places where there was known to be significant contamination.

Measurements were not taken inside houses for two reasons. Firstly the levels outside were not found to be significant and it was assumed that levels inside would be less. Secondly as there are sources volatile organic compounds such as gas cookers, central heating systems, etc., interpretation of any results would have been difficult.

Even though evidence suggested that there was no significant risk to health the SIC Environmental Services Department did issue general guidance notes for the public based on the advice to stay indoors, whenever it was not essential to be out. It is normal to try and avoid going out in severe winter gales, therefore there was little inconvenience to locals taking this advice. There are, however, some sections of the community who required to work outside for long periods of time, such as farmers. Advice to this group was to thoroughly wash off contaminants and to wear the protective vapour masks provided by the Environmental Services Department. Supplies of masks were provided at locations such as local shops.

The Wildlife Response Contingency Plan was put into action early in the incident and people were in the field from day one, a range of staff were also engaged in clean-up operations and therefore subject to atmospheric pollution from the spill.

Written procedures were quickly developed for wildlife response workers, cleaning staff, monitoring officers, etc.

Air Samples

Direct Reading Organic Vapour Analyser

As stated a direct reading organic vapour analyser was used regularly. In the period 9 to 20 January measurable levels of hydrocarbons were only found on one occasion, when on 11 January up to 6 ppm was measured in the vicinity of the house on Garths Ness. This was the day the Braer broke up and it is believed the levels of contamination may have been similar to those on the first day.

Even when the analyser was taken to within a few feet of oil dispersed in water on the beach or near to contaminated materials, no levels greater that 1 ppm (the detection limit of the device) were recorded.

Hydrocarbon Static Monitoring Results

The highest atmospheric hydrocarbon level recorded was at Garths Ness and was 6.33 ppm on the day that the Braer began to break up. The previous day the level at the same location was 0.264 ppm and the day after the level was <0.010 ppm. The corresponding benzene levels were 0.074 ppm, 0.023 ppm and <0.010 ppm.

On 12 January the day after the break up, the highest levels of hydrocarbons and benzene measured were 0.071 ppm and 0.018 ppm respectively. In the period 13 to 14 January total C3 - C8 hydrocarbons were in the range <0.010 ppm to 0.076 ppm with benzene levels of 0.010 to 0.043 ppm.

A level of 2.09 ppm of C3 - C8 hydrocarbons was measured at Scat Ness in the period 15 to 16 January. From the analysis it was considered that the major proportion of this was attributed to the compounds which could have originated from liquefied gas used for domestic purposes.

In the period 16 to 20 January the 21 C6 - C16 results were in the range 0.04 to 0.023 ppm and all of the benzene results were less than 0.001 ppm.

For comparison it is worth noting that total hydrocarbon levels in a major city at any given rush hour are likely to be in the region of 11 ppm.

The exposures of those involved in the clean up activities and in wildlife recovery were in the range 0.023 to 0.426 ppm of C6 - C16 and 0.060 to 0.187 ppm of C3 - C8 hydrocarbons. Exposures to benzene for one set of measurements were in the range of <0.001 to 0.014 ppm whilst another indicated levels were all less than 0.080 ppm/ Differences in the detection limits are a factor of the sampling period involved and the measurement technique used. The exposures to particulate matter were in the range 0.01 to 0.67 milligrams per cubic metre with all the cyclohexane extractable fraction figures being less than 0.02 milligrams per cubic metre.

Static Airborne Particulate, Deposition and Precipitation Sampling Results

On the 11 January all the results were less than 0.1 milligrams per cubic metre, the limit detection of the method used at that time. In the period 14 to 20 January the results were in the range less than 0.01 to 0.53 milligrams per cubic metre. All the cyclohexane extractable material results, apart from one of 0.14 milligrams per cubic metre, were less than 0.01 milligrams per cubic metre. The cyclohexane extractable fraction was measured to estimate the hydrocarbon contact of the particulate. These results would indicate that much of the airborne particulate were not associated with the oil but would have been sea spray and general dust or soil generated material, produced by the continuous gale force winds.

The results from the precipitation sampling indicate that sea spray and general dust were major contributors to the airborne contamination, as demonstrated by high levels of chloride in certain of the collected water samples and the suspended solids present. It is interesting to note that the highest chloride levels, obtained on the 18 and 19 January were associated with measurable levels of hydrocarbons indicating that the airborne oil particulate was associated with the sea spray.

The deposition plates indicated that on many occasions substantial proportions of the deposited material was non-cyclohexane extractable. It should also be noted that not all of the cyclohexane extractable material would be attributable to the oil; there was non-oil-associated cyclohexane extractable material present in the soil.

Drinking Water Pollution

There was no apparent deterioration in the taste of fresh water supplies throughout the period of monitoring and no complaints of taint were received from the public. Water samples nevertheless were taken from day one and sent for analysis to a number of laboratories as detailed below. Samples despatched to the different laboratories effectively overcame the transport delays brought about by the severe weather conditions.

Sullom Voe Terminal Analysis

Samples were sent to this laboratory on a daily basis. Although the limit of detection of the procedure used was 1 part per million of oil it was useful to carry out this analysis as a quick "indication" of gross pollution.

North East River Purification Board Analysis

The NERPB laboratory was used as results could be provided within 24 hours. The samples submitted indicated that the concentration of hexane extractable material in all samples was less than 1 milligram per litre which was the limit of detection of the method. In one of the 14 samples submitted there was an elevated total organic carbon level (28 milligrams per litre). All of the other results were in the range of 4.3 to 5.5 milligrams per litre. No significant peaks were found on any of the chromatograms. The total organic carbon level of 28 milligrams per litre occurred on 14 January and on the following day the level was done to 4.6 milligrams per litre. No explanation can be found for this value.

Lothian Regional Council Analysis

Two samples were submitted (7 and 13 January) and were considered to be satisfactory and to comply with the requirements of the Water Supply (Water Quality) (Scotland) Regulations 1990. There were not detectable traces of mineral hydrocarbons (less than 0.001 milligrams per litre) in either sample.

Clayton Environmental Consultants' Analysis

Had oil been the source of contamination of the water a pattern would be expected in the contaminants found, but the results indicated that there was no measurable effect on the water quality. Of the 47 benzene results obtained a measurable level of benzene was found (0.7 micrograms per litre) only on one occasion (16 January) and this was not associated with measurable levels of other compounds. All other benzene results were less than 0.3 micrograms per litre. Measurable levels of toluene were found in six samples (on the 7 and 8 January), some of which were associated with detectable concentrations of xylene. The highest combined concentration were 1.9 micrograms per litre which compares wit the standard for hydrocarbons of 10 micrograms per litre. It is know that benzene and PAHs were not detected in this sample but it is not known if other hydrocarbons may have been present. On only two occasions were measurable levels of PAHs found when the two compounds measured totalled 0.10 and 0.18 micrograms per litre compared with the 0.2 micrograms per litre standard. On all other occasions the levels of PAHs were less than the limit of detection of the method, which, depending on the sample, was in the range of 0.01 to 0.05 micrograms per litre. Only on a few occasions were levels of individual compounds in any one sample at measurable levels. The compounds may have arisen from sources which had nothing to do with the oil spill.

The results of the water analyses were compared against the requirements of the Water Supply (Water Quality) (Scotland) Regulations 1990. The values observed all complied with the requirements of these regulations.

Land Pollution

This section looks at land pollution in terms of food safety implications and the Environmental Services responsibilities rather than the effects on crops, animals, fish or shell fish as discussed earlier by the speakers from SOAFD and MLURI. The responsibility of food safety became the Environmental Services Department's when food is harvested not when it is in the sea or land i.e. when it becomes food rather than a crop.

In the first few days of the incidents the local veterinary officer together with the SAC adviser undertook a fairly comprehensive visual study of the land for animal husbandry reasons. The land was classified as having heavy, moderate, slight or no contamination. This work was widely used during and after the incident by a considerable number of organisations and individuals. During the incident the SIC and Scottish Office Home and Health Department used this information to agree an area where food stuffs originated from could not be sold for human consumption. Milk was exempted as the cows were being housed inside and fed on the previous year's silage, and there was no risk of contamination. The milk, however, was sampled anyway as a precaution.

It should be noted that there was no general ban in terms that the food was unfit for human consumption. The ban was based on the fact that food was or had been contaminated. This was because it proved impossible to establish if for example a contaminated turnip was unfit for human consumption, given that ground vegetables are normally washed and peeled before eating. This meant gardeners and farmers, if happy to do so, could eat their own produce.

During the first harvesting season before lifting the ban, samples of crops were taken just before maturity, i.e. summer of 1993. The timing of this proved to be fairly difficult as the crops needed to be harvested quickly after sampling to ensure the goods were marketable. Two cows were taken to the fields two weeks before the others and had their milk tested. Only after these tests proved satisfactory were the rest of the cows allowed into the fields. Other similar work was done on sheep and vegetables by MLURI as discussed earlier.

Health Implications / Health Study

The air pollution in the Braer incident and the consequential pollution of inland water and land was exceptional, and no national or internationally accepted standards are available against which to evaluate the environmental levels of the substances monitored. For certain substances, however, occupational exposure limits have been set and comparison with occupational health limits is one useful yardstick. It is important, however, to remember that occupational limits are set to protect against acute and chronic toxic effects of substances for those exposed for eight hours a day, five days a week over a 40 year working life. The pollution on Shetland lasted no more than a few days. It is likely, therefore, that levels of pollution in the Shetland incident would need to exceed the occupational health limits by many times over if they were to pose the same kind of risk levels.

Crude oil aerosols are much more irritant than vapours, and it is to be expected that particles of higher boiling point oily compounds and the surfactants from the dispersants, possibly together with high concentrations of salt, would have produced the eye and throat irritation reported in the incident. No environmental standards are available for such aerosols.

With the contaminants arising from the crude oil and the use of dispersants in the Braer incident the length of exposure meant that acute (short-term) effects were of more concern than any potential long term effect. If people were not experiencing any acute effects (which in the case of both crude oil and dispersants would have been respiratory and eye irritation and, in heavy contamination, skin irritation), or if the effects were transitory and disappeared once the exposure was reduced, although not desirable, would be unlikely to have long-term adverse effects on health.

HEALTH STUDY

A health study undertaken by the Environmental Health (Scotland) Unit was started on 13 January, within ten days of the grounding (Campbell et al 1993). The entire population registered with the local general practice, who were resident in the area within a three mile radius of the site of the grounding, were invited to participate in the survey. The study comprised the recording of symptoms experienced in the two weeks prior to and in the period following the incident; the testing of respiratory function using a peak expiratory flow meter; the recording of height and weight; taking of blood for tests of liver and kidney function and for haematological screening together with a toxicological screening; and testing a urine sample for protein, blood and sugar, and for toxicological markers. Exactly the same format of testing was offered to an age and sex matched control population living in the north of the Shetland Mainland who had not been exposed to the pollution incident.

Of the 635 invited, 420 responded in the test area; the control group comprised 92 individuals.

The results confirmed the anecdotal reports of headache, throat irritation, skin irritation, and itchy eyes which had begun on days 1 and 2 of the incident. No significant differences for any of the biological markers were found between those in the affected area and those in the control area, and the toxicological studies failed to show any exposures known to affect human health. The announcement of the results of the first round of testing, as well as the knowledge that the testing was to be continued, appeared to reassure the bulk of the population who were exposed.

The National Health Service Central Register Database record of each person participating in the study will be "flagged" so that significant future health events can be determined.

Personnel involved in the wildlife recovery, in the clean-up activities and the Police were not included in the health monitoring programme unless they were residents of the area covered by the study. The Direct Labour Organisation (DLO) involved in the clean-up are Shetland Islands Council employees. Assessments, as required by the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1988, were carried out for personnel involved in the wildlife recovery and in the clean-up activities. They were provided with personal protective equipment including overalls, boots, gloves and respirators. Advice was given to them and others working outdoors on the precautions to take to minimise exposure and on the actions to take of contamination occurred.

WINTER 1994 STUDY

Further studies were carried out by Thompson on behalf of SIC in summer 1993 and winter 93/94. This found (Leinster 1994) levels of hydrocarbon in Shetland during February 1994 to be similar to those reported for a rural site in England. The levels were typical of the background that would have been measured prior to the Braer incident. On the basis of current information is likely that the running annual average benzene level in Shetland, even taking into account the Braer incident, is less than the 0.005 ppm Air Quality Standard proposed by the Expert Panel in Air Quality Standards. The winter 1994 survey also indicated that much of the airborne particulate was not associated with oil but would have been sea spray and general dust or soil-generated material.

VIPs

The concern of people and the UK Government was reflected in the visit by HRH the Duke of Edinburgh, HRH the Prince of Wales and three Government Ministers. These visits do require organising but assist in obtaining necessary support and in this case lead to the formation of ESGOSS.

The Media

The media are a part of every major incident. They have to be recognised as having a significant role to play and as such media training should be given as part of exercises. For many of the key players in the Braer incident this was not the case and a rapid learning curve was necessary.

At one stage there were over 500 media personnel and 35 TV companies. We were very fortunate, however, that the facilities at Sumburgh Airport could accommodate this huge influx and provide an excellent venue in the same building as the Braer response centre for twice daily press conferences.

The press conferences lasted about one hour and any question could have been asked. The panel was usually 6 to 8 people varying in current topics, e.g. salvage, health, etc., however, the Shetland Islands Council Chief Executive, Director of Marine Operations, Director of Environmental Services and the Chief Scientific Officer of the MPCU were in attendance at every conference. The media became confident in the conferences as any questions left unanswered were followed at the next. By and large outwith conference times the incident management were left alone to get on with their work. The SIC Press Officer also arranged "one to one" interviews at the quieter moments of the day, say late evening, after the various management team meetings were concluded.

Because of the very slippery surface at the top of the cliffs immediately above the Braer we considered, initially for health and safety reasons, excluding the media from the vicinity but knowing how tenacious they can be and would have used whatever means possible to get pictures of the stricken vessel, it was decided to bus them down in small groups for short periods of time. This system was operated by the Police and worked very well. The Police were also used to keep the media out of the wildlife response centre, however, it proved almost impossible to do any work outwith security areas without attracting the attention of the media.

The severe weather meant that there were relatively long periods of inactivity and during this time the media looked for "news" stories from different angles and consequently one lesson learned is that people involved in incidents should be aware that their personal life may become of great interest to the media adding to the stress of those involved and their families, a fact that spouses and partners of key players were not aware of and found difficult to cope with.